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BARRIENTOS AND DEBRAY: 
ALL GONE OR MORE TO COME? 
The prominence and popularity of biography in explaining politics have been 
surprisingly little affected by the advent of social science. Moreover, we have 
in recent years seen the re-emergence of a rather distinct genre - that of 
'parallel lives' - which was most notably developed by Plutarch in the first 
century A.D., with more than two dozen sketches of Greek and Roman 
figures.1 Plutarch's influence has, of course, proved enduring, not only 
through Shakespeare's use of North's translation but also via Dryden, Racine 
and Emerson amongst others. It is, then, somewhat surprising to discover no 
mention of him in three modern studies: J. H. Elliott's Richelieu and Olivares, 
Michael Beschloss's Kennedy and Khrushchev, and Hitler and Stalin. Parallel 
Lives by Alan Bullock.2 
Perhaps this silence on the part of such eminent scholars, at least one of 
whom received a 'classical education', simply reflects modern acceptance of 
an approach that Plutarch himself never fully explained or defended. Yet even 
if this is the case, it is worth quoting the observation of D. A. Russell: 
... either character or circumstance may be the basis of a sunkrisis 
(comparison); similar events affecting disimilar persons and similar 
persons reacting to contrasting events alike provide a suitable field for the 
exercise. It is basically a rhetorical procedure; but it is rescued from purely 
rhetorical ingenuity by its value as a way of concentrating and directing 
the moral reflections which are the primary purpose of biography'.3 
Of course, I don't have the time to provide even a proper biographical sketch 
of Rene Barrientos and Regis Debray. Furthermore, one doubts the 
contemporary usefulness of an approach as didactic as that of Plutarch with 
respect to virtue and vice, even when reflecting on the politics of Latin America 
through the experiences of a conservative general and a radical intellectual. 
Nevertheless, Russell's argument is far from wholly redundant for these two 
individuals, who in fact never met each other and yet were the principal 
surviving protagonists on either side of the guerrilla staged by Ernesto Che 
Guevara in Bolivia in 1967. They may, then, plausibly be taken as 
representative not only of polarised political traditions and outlooks but also of 
a binding antagonism. Although these phenomena are by no means ancient, 
memory is frequently tyrannised by fashion, especially when this operates as 
mercilessly as it does within academic life. At the same time, for most of us 
Bolivia is a place as obscure as it appears to be exotic. Let me, therefore, look 
at each man before reflecting very briefly on the proposition that the qualities 
with which they are most closely associated now belong to a surpassed age and 
have been rendered redundant and ridiculous by the consolidation of a liberal 
democratic culture based upon modern capitalism and the hegemony of 
consensus. 
General Barrientos's reputation has not stood the test of time or resisted the 
invective and denigration of his many enemies. But in the last decade of his life 
- including four years as President of Bolivia - he possessed an impressive 
image at home and abroad as a charismatic military strongman or caudillo. In 
his recent biography of De Gaulle - himself scarcely a besuited wimp - Jean 
Lacouture says that Barrientos's reputation 'made people tremble'.4 This is 
exaggerated but unsurprising since the picture abroad was very much that 
painted by The Times in its obituary of '. . . a handsome . . . Airforce general 
(who) was the target of many assassination attempts, (a) dark-haired president 
(who) carried three bullets in his body'.5 This, too, was not strictly true, but 
it pales in comparison with some of the home-grown descriptions heaped upon 
Barrientos when he was at his zenith: Condor of the Andean Skies; Creator of 
the Second Republic; Paladin of Social Democracy; Restorer of Faith in the 
National Revolution; and General of the People.6 This last title is also that of 
a hagiography written for wages by Fernando Diez de Medina, who includes 
in his 350 pages the phrase,'Barrientos was Bolivia, Bolivia was Barrientos'.7 
Such an assertion strikes one as innocently foolish until we recall the 
declaration made by Rudolf Hess at a Nazi rally in 1934 that, 'Adolf Hitler is 
Germany, and Germany is Adolf Hitler'.8 Even if - as is quite likely - Diez 
de Medina was simply borrowing from the not inconsiderable corpus of 
National Socialist literature that had made its way into Bolivia in the 1930s and 
1940s, this resonance between euphoric nationalist sentiment and personalist 
political leadership is not uncommon in modern Latin America.9 Barrientos, 
for all his authoritarianism, was no Nazi, and he never succeeded in organising 
a proper political party to replace the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario 
(MNR), the movement which had led the revolution of 1952, to which he 
himself had belonged even before that revolution, and which he overthrew in 
a coup in November 1964 when he was serving as constitutional Vice-President. 
Rene Barrientos Ortuno was born in 1919 in the small provincial town of 
Tarata in the department of Cochabamba. Not untypically for this region, he 
was of mixed Quechua and Spanish blood, and his fluency in the Quechua 
language was later to play a key part in developing both regionalist backing and 
something of an indigenous identity in one of the two Latin American countries 
- the other is Guatemala - which still had a majority Amerindian population. 
Barrientos's parents were of humble, rather than poor, background, but he 
was orphaned young and, losing his brother Cesar in the Chaco War against 
Paraguay, his upbringing was overseen by sisters Corina and Elena, upon whom 
he later depended heavily. His passage from local seminary to military college 
was not unusual for somebody of his background. Nor, in fact, was Barrientos 
particularly distinctive in his admiration for the radical nationalist officers 
German Busch and Gualberto Villarroel, who from the late 1930s attempted to 
curb the power of large tin companies and reduce Bolivia's political 
dependency on Britain and the USA. Too junior to belong to the nationalist 
military lodges that supported these leaders, Barrientos nonetheless opposed the 
conservatives who came to power in 1946, and he penned a very short and 
rather uninspiring pamphlet calling for 'the glorious and valiant army to free 
itself from vulgar obeisance to the tin companies'.10 Cashiered, but having 
already qualified as a pilot, he flew missions for the insurgent MNR in the civil 
war of 1949, and in April 1952, following the party's eventual capture of power 
in a three-day insurrection, it was Barrientos who volunteered to bring the 
MNR leader Victor Paz Estenssoro back from exile in Buenos Aires. 
The MNR nationalised the major tin mines, decreed an extensive agrarian 
reform, and introduced universal suffrage for the poorest country in mainland 
America. Under strong pressure from the left-wing miners' union, the party had 
little choice but to acquiesce in the formation of popular militias, which for a 
while threatened the very existence of the regular armed forces. Perhaps wisely, 
Barrientos spent a fair part of the 1950s on postings and courses abroad, 
including, according to his enemies, a spell in a US psychiatric hospital. In all 
events, it is only in the early 1960s, following the Cuban Revolution and the 
accelerating division and right-wing drift of the MNR that he came firmly into 
the public eye. As the party's authority decomposed and its rule became more 
violent, Barrientos exploited his dual role as commander of the airforce and 
leader of the MNR's military lodge to promote the restoration of the armed 
forces, staging a thinly disguised bonapartist campaign that attracted increasing 
support from Washington and the very private companies against which he had 
railed in the 1940s. Indeed, once he came to office, the general reversed a great 
many of the political positions that he had championed a decade earlier. 
If Barrientos was widely denounced as an opportunist and traitor, at least he 
staked out his ground emphatically, using language that manifested little or no 
modulation: 
'The Fatherland is in danger. A vast Communist conspiracy, planned and 
funded by international extremism has exploited the good faith of some 
sectors of labour in trying to pit the people against the armed forces . . . 
It doesn't matter that the snipers, the masters of blackmail, demagogy and 
lies heap up mountains of calumny against the armed forces. They are 
frustrated; their epilepsy and maladies do not impress our glorious 
institution, effectively at the service of the people and against the 
traffickers who suck on the credulity and good will of the workers.'11 
The same man who expressed these sentiments ensured that he was made a 
freemason days before coming to office, and having done so promptly 
appointed eight close relatives to ministries, ambassadorships or directorships 
of state corporations.12 He was, perhaps, not overly prejudiced in such a 
macho culture by the fact that, rather like John Kennedy, he had a high sex 
drive over which he exercised poor control, although to describe him as Priapic 
is probably to give his activities an undeserved classical gloss.13 Only 
recognising eight children as his own but promising to adopt more than 50, 
Barrientos was thrice married, once bigamously, to his 'first lady' Rosemarie 
Galindo - a union that he failed to regularise, he said, 'because of pressure of 
work', instead contracting nuptials with Cati Rivas a month before he died.14 
Such antics greatly exasperated the prelates, but the populace as a whole 
seemed more perplexed by Barrientos's efforts to justify the outlawing of trade 
unions, manipulations of the Constitution, erratic suppression of opposition 
parties, and attacks on the student movement: 
'I am', said the President, 'a man of the Christian left - nationalist in 
economics, democratic in doctrine. But this democracy is just, active, 
belligerent, dynamic and profoundly revolutionary because I am seeking 
only social justice and the happiness of the peasant, worker and middle 
class majority; in sum, the happiness of the people.'15 
Of course, one should never underestimate the power of even the most 
incomprehensible and leaden rhetoric when it is delivered with energy and 
conviction. And it is to this, I feel, that Barrientos owed his significant 
popularity. He was, above all else, a man of action for whom heroic feats were 
essential and sheer movement an adequate substitute for rationality. 
Barrientos was by far the most peripatetic of Bolivia's presidents. Often he 
would conduct essential business in La Paz early into the morning so that he 
could spend the daylight hours moving around the republic, dropping into the 
smallest and most isolated communities to shake hands, share a drink or meal, 
distribute footballs and bicycles, speechify and, above all, ratify the existence 
of the president. Such paternalism was, of course, an integral feature of 
traditional patterns of authority, the exchange of hospitality and fealty for gifts 
and recognition reaffirming identities in a manner that is only partially 
understood in terms of patron and client. It was all made possible in an 
exceptionally mountainous country courtesy of the helicopter, first used over 
the Bolivian altiplano in mid-1962 and rapidly adopted by Barrientos, who 
enjoyed the permanent loan of a Bell craft from Gulf Oil, one of the companies 
favoured by his 'open-door' economic policies. 
One civic-minded citizen concerned at the expense of such activity wrote to 
the press to observe that in two years these trips must have cost at least 
$700,000, the president having travelled the equivalent of two-thirds of the 
distance between the earth and the moon.16 This comparison is telling because, 
of course, Barrientos ruled Bolivia, and ruled it from the air, at a time when 
space travel had captured the global imagination. Sometimes this occurred 
rather too vividly, as when a puma was reported to have landed from outer 
space near the town of Ayo Ayo, just a fortnight before Telstar was launched 
and while John Glenn's capsule was on display in Mexico City.17 In such a 
context, though, even an aviator of most illiberal outlook and attachment to 
'order' might appear not only glamorous but also dazzlingly modern. 
It seems unlikely that Rene Barrientos would have comprehended Aristotle's 
bracketing of the virtue of courage with the vice of audacity as well as 
cowardice.18 Yet if he vacillated over major political decisions in a manner 
that belied his impulsive personal style, he could never be accused of bodily 
cowardice.19 Indeed, it might even be said that his career hinged on three 
instances of physical fortitude or suffering. 
Barrientos first won widespread popular acclaim in October 1961 when some 
20,000 people gathered at the El Alto aerodrome above La Paz to watch a 
demonstration of parachuting, which had been attempted only twice before in 
the country - in 1939 and 1947. This event - central to a much-publicised 
aeronautical week organised by the general - went horribly wrong when the 
'chutes of three of the 15 soldiers who made the drop failed to open and they 
fell to their deaths in front of the crowd. Faced with accusations of allowing his 
men to use inferior equipment, Barrientos simply invited the press back to El 
Alto, put on one of the dead men's parachute and executed a faultless jump 
himself.20 
In February 1964 the general staged an energetic but futile effort at the 
MNR's Ninth National Convention to have himself nominated as vice-
presidential candidate for the general elections to be held in August of that 
year. Upon hearing of his defeat, he got heartily drunk and indulged in a 
number of emotional outbursts that did not augur well for President Victor Paz 
and the apparatchiks who had manipulated the convention. A month later at two 
in the morning, Barrientos was shot as he left the home of his sister Corina 
following a meeting with supporters. The attack, which was very probably 
staged by the MNR's political police, the Control Politico, seemed finally to 
have removed a threatening loser as Barrientos, hit in the chest, collapsed to the 
ground. However, the bullet had struck the metal United States Airforce 
insignia habitually worn by the general, shattering on impact with the result that 
no organs were damaged and he suffered only slight flesh wounds, caused by 
splinters. 
Perhaps the most sober lesson which can be drawn from this incident is that 
the important thing about uniforms is that they are different. But Barrientos and 
his US friends were taking no chances. At 8.45 am, following a brief operation, 
he was taken to El Alto, and by 6.15 pm he was in the Panama Canal Zone, 
recovering in a US military hospital. Victor Paz, fully able to read the writing 
on the wall, moved quickly to have the elected vice-presidential candidate 
resign and, after an enterprising re-interpretation of party statutes, he was able 
to send a cable to Panama offering Barrientos the position as his running-
mate.21 This was readily accepted, the office being exploited within six 
months to depose Paz and end a dozen years of MNR rule. 
A year later, having taken dictatorial power, the general was again shot, but 
because he was driving a jeep and wearing protective clothing, of the three 
bullets that struck him only one caused a major wound - in the buttocks. This 
shooting took place on the road between Tarata and Cochabamba, and 
Barrientos was immediately ferried to the house of his sister Elena, where he 
remained for several days in what appears to have been a deliberately contrived 
atmosphere of crisis - almost melodrama - as delegations of officers visited 
him to express their backing and urge a return to the capital. The tenuous 
gravity of the moment was not assisted by the fact that the detectives sent to 
investigate the crime had to exclude the general's underpants as evidence 
because they had, quite fittingly, already been laundered in 'Ace' washing 
powder by Leonor Lezama, Elena's maid.22 The tension cultivated during this 
incident was again exploited by Barrientos, who, having tested his support 
within the high command, and probably his own self-confidence as well, called 
a precipitate halt to the truce with his opponents and launched a major offensive 
against the left. 
It is tempting - especially within the academy - to ignore all but the folkloric 
qualities of such matters. This, though, would be a mistake - one, I sense, made 
by Che Guevara and Regis Debray in 1967. It is certainly true that Rene 
Barrientos had by then become a figure loathed by many in the working class 
for his violent record of repression, and he was despised by much of a middle 
class youth negotiating the rapids between the elitism of adolescent Christian 
Democracy and that of a socially deracinated Leninism. It is also the case that 
Barrientos himself played a minimal role in the military operations against 
Guevara. Moreover, his propaganda war against the guerrilla was seen abroad 
as complete buffoonery. And yet one has to ask oneself why his regime was so 
little threatened by this insurgency when, despite a multitude of errors made by 
the radical left, so many of its charges were entirely accurate and widely 
accepted. Undoubtedly, the calculating young rationalists were spectacularly 
wrong-footed by an expressive, instinctive politician whose populist edge lay 
precisely in his unpredictability, and whose vulnerability was masked - not 
revealed - by his capacity for mouthing gibberish. 
Barrientos survived Che Guevara by some 18 months. He died - as might 
have been expected - in a helicopter crash on one of his dashes around the 
country. For a while foul play was suspected - not least on the part of Cati 
Rivas's ex-husband, the ebullient Captain Faustino Rico Toro - but the 
laborious autopsies practised on the defunct president could not shake the most 
sober explanation. Unable to accept this, some, including police Colonel Oscar 
Vargas Valenzuela, resorted to the astral plane of investigation and consulted 
the general's spirit - an inadvisable course of action since the Bolivian Church 
lacks a qualified exorcist, and there stands in the city of Oruro a house, once 
occupied by German dabblers in the occult, that remains empty and haunted 
even after the ministrations of officials sent from Rome. As it happens, Colonel 
Vargas was informed by the general's shade that his death was 'due to a simple 
accident'.23 
When he was in the realm of the quick Barrientos had declared, 'to die is part 
of life. Those who fear death cannot command'.24 This is one of the few 
sentiments that he assuredly shared with Guevara. It is also, perhaps, not 
surprising, in view of his experience in Bolivia 25 years ago, to find in 
Debray's Critique of Political Reason the declaration that, 'Death is the lyrical 
core of the individual, the site where he discovers that he is irreplaceable'.25 
In turning to Regis Debray one might legitimately expect some relief from 
the kind of excitements that have just been described. This, however, can only 
be partial for although Debray may properly be described as an intellectual, he 
was very young when he resolved to harness his analytical skills directly to the 
struggle for revolutionary socialism. To the best of my knowledge, the only 
time that he has been fully employed in an academic post was in 1966, in Cuba. 
It is, then, not entirely surprising that when, on 20 April 1967, Debray was 
detained by elements of the Bolivian army's Fourth Division near the village 
of Muyupampa in the middle of the guerrilla zone of operations his 
protestations that he was only covering the campaign as a journalist were not 
readily accepted. Several days later a rather elated General Barrientos told the 
international press that Debray was a guerrilla and agent of Fidel Castro whose 
adventures would end in Bolivia.26 In fact, neither claim was proved to be 
true, but the first was more than plausible and, for a while, the second seemed 
highly likely. 
Jules Regis Debray was born in Paris in September 1940, the son of 
relatively affluent lawyers who were soon to become members of the 
Resistance. When he was arrested in Bolivia his mother, Janine, active in 
conservative politics, was Vice President of the municipal council of Paris, on 
which she had served for 20 years; his father, Georges, a distinguished attorney, 
was a member of the Council of Lawyers and a Chevalier of the Legion of 
Honour. Such a respectable bourgeois background later proved vital in 
promoting a high-profile campaign in Debray's defence, but it did not 
apparently provoke an exceptionally talented youth to acts of social rebellion 
or idle iconoclasm. Indeed, Regis appears to have fulfilled the exacting 
expectations of his parents, receiving the 1957 national philosophy prize for 
secondary students from his mother's hands and graduating first from the Lycee 
Louis-le-Grand in 1959. That year his parents rewarded him with a holiday in 
the USA, but when in Miami he diverted to Havana for several weeks in order 
to witness the recently triumphant Cuban Revolution. On his return Debray 
entered the Ecole Normale Superieure to study for a master's in philosophy 
with Louis Althusser. In 1961 he visited South America for several months; and 
he returned there in 1963 for a stay of 18 months, visiting every country except 
Paraguay. Subsequently he began to study for a doctorate in social 
anthropology under the supervision of Maurice Godelier. 
Debray was, therefore, scarcely wet behind the ears when he was arrested in 
Bolivia. However, local opinion seems to have been that the combination of his 
intelligence and self-esteem - even some sympathetic commentators talked of 
arrogance - had transformed the Frenchman into what is known in that part of 
the world as a S'unchu Luminaria - the sense of which might be translated as 
'somebody whose fine words mesmerise only momentarily'. Another reaction 
was that Debray was a Q'incha Qhara, which literally means 'unlucky 
European' but which can also signify 'European who brings bad luck'. 
Certainly, as he awaited a court martial on the eve of his 27th birthday, charged 
with murder, robbery, grievous bodily harm and rebellion, Regis Debray 
appeared to be paying a very high price for a folie de grandeur that 
compounded the assurance of a comfortable metropolitan upbringing, the 
pretensions of Althusser's marxist theoreticism, and the presumptions of Cuban 
revolutionary internationalism. It is a heady mix and - combined with his 
significant literary talent - it should remind us that Debray, like Barrientos, can 
only be taken as 'representative' by virtue of his being outstanding. 
A week after he had been arrested, beaten into a coma and threatened with 
death, Debray, understandably pessimistic about his prospects, started to write 
down some reflections on his short life. Initial declarations, such as 'Memories 
don't interest me', reverberate with the petulance with which he responded to 
his interrogators. But this brief memoir settles down as soon as its author casts 
his mind back to the regime at the rue d'Ulm and the outlook of the young 
philosophers at the Ecole Normale Superieure: 
'. . . we thought', he tells us, 'we could analyse our world and our hearts 
at arm's length . . . a fine philosopher who was guiding our steps as 
students, and had introduced us to Karl Marx, gave us the entree to the 
kingdom that he was himself exploring, that of theoretical rigour and 
dialectical materialism, as a theory of general praxis . . . All very fine: 
theory draws its effectiveness from its rigorousness, and its rigorousness 
is effective because it separates "development in reality" from 
"development in thought", the "operation of society" from the "operation 
of knowledge". In other words, all we had to do to become good 
theoreticians was to be lazy bastards.'27 
Under the circumstances this is a pardonable exaggeration, but it is also quite 
a justified response to Althusser's progressive elimination of the core 
philosophical problem of the guarantees of knowledge and truth as well as his 
relentless invective against the ideological illusions of immediate experience. 
This passage is from Althusser's book Reading Capital, published in 1965, 
when Debray was back in Paris: 
4We must take seriously the fact that the theory of history, in the strong 
sense, does not exist, or hardly exists as far as historians are concerned; 
that the concepts of existing history are therefore nearly always "empirical" 
concepts . . . that is, cross-bred with a powerful strain of ideology 
concealed behind its "obviousness".'28 
As Perry Anderson has observed, such a position is an almost exact replica 
of Spinoza's logical progression from the monist dictum that 'Truth is the 
criterion both of itself and of falsehood' to the assertion that the primary 
delusion of humanity is the conviction that individuals are free in their volition, 
or, as Spinoza puts it, Their idea of freedom is simply their ignorance of any 
cause of their actions'.29 
It is not too difficult to see how such an approach complicates the issue of 
political commitment and daily practice for the radical philosopher. Certainly, 
it places a large question mark over Che Guevara's slogan that it is 'the duty 
of the revolutionary to make the revolution' - a call to which Debray was 
exposed even before he was to grapple with Althusser's rejection of 
'the empiricist model of a chance "hypothesis" whose verification must be 
provided by the political practice of history before we can affirm its 
"truth"'.30 
Combine these two positions and you can readily attempt to make the 
revolution free of any prior 'historical' verification of your ideas, or, 
alternatively, you might stoically restrict yourself to contemplation and 
criticism. Althusser tended to the latter option, albeit at some cost to his real-
world relations with the leadership of the French Communist Party. It is, 
perhaps, telling that on 1 March 1967, just as Debray was making his way from 
La Paz to the guerrilla zone, Althusser wrote his student a letter, commenting 
on Debray's recently published book Revolution in the Revolution?. Althusser 
says: 
'The struggle poses urgent demands. But it is sometimes politically urgent 
to withdraw for a while, and to take stock; everything depends on the 
theoretical work done at that time . . . Time thus taken away from the 
struggle may ultimately be a saving of time . . . I see this as being the duty 
of all working class and revolutionary intellectuals. They are entrusted by 
the people in arms with the guardianship and extension of scientific 
knowledge.'31 
It was, of course, too late. Debray, like many students, had drawn rather 
different conclusions to those of his professor. 'The intellectual', he wrote in 
Revolution in the Revolution?, 
'will try to grasp the present through preconceived ideological constructs 
and live it through books. He will be less able than others to invent, 
improvise, make do with available resources, decide instantly on bold 
moves when he is in a tight spot. Thinking that he already knows, he will 
learn more slowly, display less flexibility.'32 
Some might think this observation good for most occasions, but Debray was 
applying it to guerrilla warfare, with which strategy for the Latin American 
revolution he had already become closely identified through the publication in 
1965 of an extended essay, 'Castroism: the Long March in Latin America'.33 
Perhaps, despite the pious disclaimers just mentioned, he saw in guerrilla 
warfare more than just a repudiation of the mores and experience of the Ecole 
Normale Superieure. Maybe he discerned in the conjunction of intellect and 
force that praxis about which Althusser had lectured and around which no small 
part of classical literature revolves? 
Whatever the case, Debray's writing on this subject is not essentially 
original. Despite a distinctive polemical flair and analytical insight, its central 
thrust is clearly derived from the interpretation of the Cuban Revolution made 
by Che Guevara, who within months of the overthrow of Batista's dictatorship 
produced an admirably cogent defence of what became known as foquismo. 
Guevara tells us, 
'We consider that the Cuban Revolution contributed three fundamental 
lessons to the conduct of revolutionary movements in America. They are: 
1. Popular forces can win a war against the army. 
2. It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution 
exist; the insurrection can create them. 
3. In underdeveloped America the countryside is the basic area for armed 
conflict. 
Of these three propositions, the first two contradict the defeatist attitude 
of revolutionaries or pseudo-revolutionaries who remain inactive and take 
refuge on the pretext that against a professional army nothing can be done, 
who sit down to wait until in some mechanical way all necessary objective 
and subjective conditions are given without working to accelerate 
them.'34 
Of course, the disastrous defeat of Guevara's own guerrilla was but the most 
poignant example of the insufficiencies of this compelling voluntarism, against 
which the political objections and historical evidence mounted up with tragic 
velocity. For our purposes there is no need to detail this process, which is the 
subject of a rich literature.35 However, it is certainly worth noting that the 
appeal of a political philosophy rooted so positively in making a revolution and 
overcoming objective constraints through action is not limited to periods of 
radical optimism and advance; it may also - if not equally - acquire a 
constituency in times - such as our own - of embattlement and despair. 
Debray's practical experience of conducting this struggle was short and 
sobering. Arriving at Che's camp in the first week of March 1967 together with 
two other foreign visitors, he was initially anxious to become a combatant 
although he had entered Bolivia officially and as a journalist for a Mexican 
magazine. Guevara, however, immediately asked him to organise a solidarity 
campaign in France, and noted pithily in his diary that the suggestion that 
Debray return to Europe via Cuba was 'an idea which coincides with his desires 
to marry and have a child with his woman'. A week later Guevara, who gave 
Debray three interviews, noted that, 'the Frenchman stated too vehemently how 
useful he could be on the outside' - an account that Debray, to his considerable 
credit, himself volunteered before Che's diary was published.36 Indeed, at his 
trial the Frenchman - whom the guerrillas nicknamed 'Danton' - made an 
eloquent defence speech around his declaration, 'I regret that I am innocent'.37 
In this he stresses that Guevara even gave his increasingly burdensome visitors 
a choice of how and when to leave the force - an offer which, given the 
progressively vulnerable position of the guerrilla, clearly indicated that they 
were not subject to military discipline.38 
The fact that Debray was able to make an unashamedly heroic defence 
speech owes not a little to his lawyer, Raul Novillo Villarroel, whose 
enterprising but careful demolition of the loose case made against his client 
revealed the determination of the three military judges to pass a verdict of 
guilty and impose the maximum sentence of 30 years. This should not surprise 
us - a score of young conscripts had been killed during the seven weeks of 
Debray's presence with the rebels, and yet now not only De Gaulle and Sartre 
but also Malraux, Robert Kennedy and Bertrand Russell were requesting a 
pardon and scrutinising the legal procedures and moral rectitude of their 
country. Moreover, the guerrilla had clearly been set up and led by Cubans, 
and here was this Frenchman who supported the whole enterprise and yet 
expected with Olympian condescension to get off because he had not himself 
squeezed a trigger. Recognising the odds - but not, I think, quite why they were 
so poor - Debray cast aside caution. In a closed session, following an officially 
contrived outburst by spectators, he informed the colonels, 
'Each one has to decide which side he is on - on the side of military 
violence or guerrilla violence, on the side of violence that represses or 
violence that liberates. Crimes in the face of crimes . . . You choose 
certain ones, I choose others, that's all.'39 
But it is not quite all, for while a colonel might indeed commit a crime, an 
intellectual would only be on its side. Debray, then, standing on firm legal 
ground, makes a moral virtue out of a necessity. 'Guilty of what?' he asks his 
judges. 'And on what grounds? Political? Granted. Criminal? Inadmissable'. 
' . . . tell me: "We are condemning you because you are a Marxist-Leninist, 
because you wrote Revolution in the Revolution?, a book that was read by 
some guerrillas in your absence. We are condemning you because you are 
a confessed admirer of Fidel Castro and came here to speak with Che 
without first requesting permission from the authorities . . ." That's fine. 
I have nothing to say.'40 
Debray's wish was not granted. Apart from anything else, the international 
furore caused by his trial had persuaded Barrientos to execute Guevara 
summarily in order to avoid an even worse outcry. Now that this had been done 
and still held the world's attention a month later, there was nothing whatsoever 
to be gained from indulging the Frenchman.41 
Debray spent over three years in prison before being released by a military 
president. In February 1968 he was allowed to marry his sweetheart, Elizabeth 
Burgos, who was given visiting rights for ten days every three months. He had, 
of course, nothing to do with the events in Paris of that year - a fact that might 
explain his subsequent interpretation that their 'real meaning' was the 
establishment of a new bourgeois republic on a 'modern or American 
individualist agenda'.42 Upon his release he interviewed the Chilean president 
Salvador Allende, the leading regional exponent of 'the peaceful road to 
socialism', but whilst there are clear signs of Debray being chastened, he 
showed no major shift in his line. Indeed, after Allende's death in 1973, the 
Frenchman wrote in his account of Guevara's last campaign that 'it is right to 
fight'.43 
The shift, I think, comes after Debray has settled his analytical accounts with 
the guerrilla experience in the two-volume work La Critique des Armes, the 
publication of which in 1974 coincided with the onset of dictatorial regimes in 
South America. Aside from several novels, apparently written for personal 
catharsis and not without some quite nasty things to say about readily 
identifiable individuals, Debray leaves Latin America and concentrates upon 
France itself.44 It is unremarkable, even from what little has already been 
described, that he should write a study of modern intellectuals - a survey that 
was predictably controversial and unusually 'empirical' in its approach.45 
Indeed, it is refreshing to find - even if only in a footnote in the Critique of 
Political Reason - this author declaring, 'no concrete analysis of a given 
historical period can proceed by deduction (the use of categories). At most it 
can infer certain localised results and contrast them with a global conception 
of social history'.46 
At times the sheer eclecticism and lack of focus of this work put one in mind 
of Ortega y Gasset's comment of Stendhal - that he 'possessed a head full of 
theories; but . . . lacked the gifts of a theoretician'.47 This may sound harsh, 
but to a non-theorist it looks like pretty good company to be keeping, and the 
view, I think, is justified by Debray's reluctance to develop theories beyond his 
immediate polemical needs. This is the case in his latest work, Que Vive la 
Repiiblique, a quite emotional text that places its author in the tradition of 
Michelet and Durkheim as he revindicates the state and the collective - even 
when known or felt through myth - against the particularities of civil society. 
One does not baulk when Debray effectively fingers post-modernism as 
landscaped ethnomethodology, but when he protests that the media today pays 
inordinate attention to the death of a celebrity from AIDS, wondering why it 
cannot take corresponding interest in the grandeur of a speech by Saint-Just, 
one feels that this - rather than 'Danton' - would have been a more fitting nom 
de guerre for his earlier incarnation.48 
Debray, of course, has been a servant of the state for over a decade, first 
advising President Mitterand on third world affairs and subsequently joining the 
Conseil d'Etat as well as serving as secretary of the South Pacific Council. It 
is, perhaps, a fitting irony that in this latter capacity he not only promoted a 
new regional university to 'combat Anglo-Presbyterian morality' but also 
defended the testing of nuclear devices on the Mururoa atoll by approving the 
detention of protesting squatters, including one Mr Charlie Chang and 17 
members of his Taata Tahiti Tiana party who were found guilty under a 1935 
statute relating to economic crimes. One does not, of course, imagine that Mr 
Chang and his followers played any part in Mitterand's recent call for other 
states to follow his 'unilateral' halting of nuclear tests, but one is grateful that 
the choice of violence on offer was so clear-cut. 
Since we have moved on rather precipitately 25 years from 1967 let me turn 
briefly to the question raised in the title - 'all gone or more to come?' - which, 
apart from a not entirely misplaced evocation of infantile loss and deferred 
gratification, signals the lurking presence of some very grand theory in the 
shape of Francis Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man. This text, 
published in 1992, declares quite unambiguously that the ideal-types represented 
for us by Barrientos and Debray have no significant role to play in future world 
events although they may possibly linger on the margins of the stage until 
market economics and liberal democracy have finally seeped into every last 
cranny. 
This is assuredly not the place to get to grips with Dr Fukuyama's expansive 
thesis, but we should at least take note of the extraordinary confidence with 
which it is propounded. 
'Technology', Fukuyama informs us, 'makes possible the limitless 
accumulation of wealth, and thus the satisfaction of an ever-expanding set 
of human desires. This process guarantees an increasing homogenization 
of all human societies, regardless of their historical origins or cultural 
inheritances. All countries undergoing economic modernization must 
increasingly resemble one another; they must unify nationally on the basis 
of a centralized state, urbanize, replace traditional forms of social 
organization like tribe, sect, and family with economically rational ones 
based on function and efficiency'.49 
For Fukuyama this is clear because we have already crossed the threshold of 
'the end of history'. He is in no doubt that there will be, as he puts it, 'no 
further progress in the development of underlying principles and institutions 
because all of the really big questions (have) been settled'.50 Moreover, he 
gives Latin America a quite significant role in a transition that nobody could 
sensibly deny has started to take place but that few would deign to insist - even 
with such a glorious melange of borrowed philosophy, poor history and 
wholesale wishful thinking - is going to end where he says it will, still less that 
it is the last transition of all. Nonetheless, one has to accept that this is a theory 
that - rather like post-modernism - has proved quite resistant to the collapse 
of many of its particular features, reflecting more than a purely philosophical 
mood. Indeed, it might even bear out some of Debray's laconic ruminations on 
'developments in thought' and 'developments in reality'. 
There is no need to embark upon a detailed survey to comprehend why the 
present conjuncture in Latin America might contribute to the conviction that 
'liberal democracy remains the only coherent political aspiration' and free 
markets, or liberal economics, an inevitable destiny.51 As Victor Bulmer-
Thomas showed us so clearly some weeks ago, the last five years in particular 
have seen an emphatic shift in regional economic policy away from corporatist 
capitalism towards free market principles, producing in several countries a 
notable reduction in inflation as well as state intervention; overall economic 
performance has registered a significant improvement.52 Moreover, the 
imposition of invariably harsh and initially inequitable and unpopular 
deflationary policies has almost everywhere been undertaken by elected civilian 
administrations - the result of an impressive if still unfinished transfer from 
dictatorship to constitutional rule over the last decade. Since 1988 every country 
has held an election, and some - including Bolivia - have been governed by 
three or four successive civilian administrations resulting from the popular vote. 
Even in those cases, such as El Salvador and Guatemala, where the electoral 
process began very much as a US imposition and unashamedly excluded the 
left, there has been some - occasionally much - progress towards a negotiated 
truce. 
It is surely telling that the region's one Communist state - Cuba - has not 
made this transition, but it is also a widely held view that spiteful US policy 
has played a major role in fortifying the nationalist resolve of the leadership in 
Havana. It may even be that poor Cuba is having to represent her sister 
republics in defying the arrogant Gringo with a kind of dusk chorus of 
denunciation. If Fidel Castro retains a remarkable popularity throughout the 
region, this now rests heavily on nostalgia, and in many ways he would serve 
as quite a passable amalgam of Barrientos and Debray. 
Today the internationalist is not a European left-wing philosopher but a 
conservative North American economist - Professor Jeffry Sachs of Harvard, 
who, having presided over the Bolivian stabilisation plan of 1985 proceeded to 
Warsaw and Moscow, and, although he may perforce have to dally there 
awhile, one can readily imagine him pushing on to Beijing via Hanoi. 
In the political realm the fact that the Latin American dictatorships were 
generally able to determine the nature of their departure sets them apart from 
the experience of the east in 1989 and the west in 1945. It has also left a 
distinctly disturbing set of dilemmas between revenge and reconciliation that 
are largely being handled at an official level by a retreat from prosecution to 
amnesty to outright 'forgetfulness', as well as through a clear shift from the 
naming of those alleged to have committed crimes to that of those known to 
have been their victims. This may be successful in terms of statecraft, but it is 
much less so at the level of civil society, especially for the direct victims of 
repression and their families. Anybody who knows Ariel Dorfman's recent play 
Death and the Maiden cannot fail to appreciate this.53 
The question of human rights has not, in fact, provoked open conflict to the 
same degree as have economic policy and corruption. Moreover, if a refusal to 
forget or forgive remains at the core of both survival and deterrence, it is worth 
noting Jose Woldenberg's observation that as the victims and their repressors 
die the objective effects of this sentiment necessarily decline. In the case of 
Latin America, where the savagery of dictatorship has occurred very recently, 
the more likely scenario for de facto acquiescence is the coming maturity of a 
generation too young to have remembered - half the present population of 
Chile, for example, was born after Pinochet's coup in 1973.54 
This picture may not fully accord with Fukuyama's bouncy predictions, but 
it would appear to herald the disappearance of the likes of Barrientos and 
Debray. On the one hand, the warrior who grasps office with scant regard for 
policy and holds it by a combination of dashing deeds, demonisation and 
unabashed political dependency. And on the other, the radical thinker for whom 
foreignness and the terrible risks of failure on the insurrectionary road to 
civilisation are strictly secondary considerations in a decisive culture of 
commitment. Whether or not we deem these attributes even partly worthy, they 
are widely seen to be anachronisms. One is reminded of that passage in Gabriel 
Garcia Marquez's The General in his Labyrinth where Bolivar admonishes a 
Frenchman: '. . . stop doing us the favour of telling us what we should do . . . 
Damn it, please let us have our Middle Ages in peace!'55 Except, of course, 
that after 160 years the Middle Ages are over, and, Fukuyama assures us, there 
is now on earth no apparent problem that is not soluble on the basis of liberal 
principles.56 
Some caution is evidently called for. In the first place, not even Fukuyama's 
sources concur on whether the linear ascent of human history to this felicitous 
apogee will greatly reduce the incidence of warfare. As a result, we might 
expect the ancient disparities between the warrior and the scribe to continue for 
a while yet. 
Secondly, it is typical of intellectuals to assign transcendent importance to 
underlying principles when ordinary folk are far more concerned with the 
tactile reality pressing in on them every day. One should not, then, 
underestimate the indisputably harsh price being paid by Latin America's poor 
for economic stabilisation or the cholera that is presently afflicting them or the 
sense of injustice over past violations of human rights and present corruption. 
It would be even more unwise to assume that these are consciously traded for 
acquiescence in liberalism on the belief that this is the true 'development in 
reality'. Unlike in eastern Europe, a great deal of what is currently occurring 
has been seen before and illusions are more modest in a region that has been 
far more and much longer market-oriented than some theorists - right- and left-
wing alike - recognise. 
Against the impressive quietude of Argentina and Chile over the last two 
years one must pitch the eruption of popular fury in Venezuela and the 
suspension of constitutional guarantees and government in Peru. Furthermore, 
one might note that in this latter country a particularly violent and remarkably 
resourceful insurrectionary movement - Sendero Luminoso - is headed by a 
man - Abimael Guzman - who has not been seen in public for over ten years, 
suffers acutely from diabetes, and is the author of a thesis on Kant's theory of 
space. These are not obvious components of a charismatic leader although 
among several Bolivian figures who exercise an influence well beyond the 
customary parameters of public respect I would single out Eduardo Nava 
Morales, for many years Dean of Economics at San Andres University in La 
Paz, a man whose work on Keynes in the early 1950s had an influence on the 
MNR, and who now, with the loss of his middle ear aggravating a famously 
bad temper, poor eyesight and a tendency to obesity, may be seen each day 
being assisted down the street to his classes by students whom he will shortly 
berate. 
It is, though, much more often a combination of healthy physique and 
oratorial energy that one associates with charismatic authority, as illustrated by 
the description given in the Mexican daily La Jornada of Comandante Hugo 
Chavez, the officer who led a violent coup attempt in Venezuela this last 
February against the deeply disliked regime of Carlos Andres Perez. Given 
Chavez's subsequent popularity, it would seem clear that many people shared 
La Jornada s view of him as 
'young and slim. His trim and clean mestizo features highlighted a smooth 
sensuality. The contrast with the palid and flaccid masks of the 
parliamentary bureaucracy was striking . . . the sense of self-control and 
military discipline, honour and serene conviction in the face of uncertain 
destiny distinguished the soldier as a classic hero . . . his words invoked 
with tenderness the name in which independence is rooted: Bolivar . . . the 
soldier accepted full and absolute responsibility for the events of the night 
- something which surprised public opinion, tired of a political system 
that, in the name of anonymity, permits social crimes to be committed with 
impunity.'57 
This contrast, which is not too exaggerated, evokes that between Barrientos 
and the MNR. More importantly, however, the inclusion of Bolivar's name in 
the title of the rebel movement underlines the dangers of adopting Fukuyama's 
unproblematic division between ancient and modern, or the post-historical. For 
the fact is that in Latin America the two are not separate - not even parallel -
but passionately entwined. It is not, then, simply a question of arguing that 
Latin American 'modernity' began in 1922 with the publication of Cesar 
Vallejo's poem 'Trilce', or in 1946 with the opening of the Volta Redonda 
steelworks, or in 1973 with the coup in Chile. Rather, it is a matter of 
unburdening ourselves of the unilinear perspective that confuses the 
'development' of political economy with the 'nature' of a society in its entirety. 
Last month I attended a clandestine meeting in an industrial suburb of 
Mexico City where a man known as El Hermanito and reckoned to be inhabited 
by the spirit of the great lord Cuauhtemoc conducted major surgical operations 
with a regular household knife and without anaesthetic on patients who 
included qualified doctors and computer programmers as well as peasants and 
street-sellers. As a result, I am probably too impressed by and indulgent of the 
regional propensity for metaphysics in general and rebirth in particular, but one 
ignores such phenomena at the cost of gravely misunderstanding the people for 
whom they possess great meaning. There is undoubtedly a quality of innocence 
about the persons and activities of Barrientos and Debray; they belong to a by-
gone age. Yet innocence is defiantly relative. 
I want to finish by upholding the claims of 'the third man'. By this I mean 
a representative of those who died in defeat, as opposed to Barrientos, a victor 
felled in his prime, or Debray, one of the vanquished who was spared to 
ruminate. 'All gone' means 'disappeared', which in Latin America is 
immediately understood to signify physically executed with the body destroyed 
or hidden. As a result, there are very many names that one could pin on this 
third figure, but today I choose Jorge Rios Dalenz - a man whom I never met 
and who does not appear in the report of the Rettig Commission set up by the 
new Chilean government. This is because investigation of those killed under 
Pinochet depended upon a submission by family or close friends, and Rfos was 
a Bolivian without relatives in Chile. 
Chichi Rios Dalenz, a member of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left 
exiled from Bolivia two years earlier, was executed at the same time as the 
singer Victor Jara - on 15 or 16 September 1973 - in the Estadio Chile, where 
they had been held for three days.58 Once described as 'the flower of the 
Bolivian left' for his restless creativity and organisational energy, he is now 
little more than a sentimental footnote in the past of Jaime Paz Zamora, who 
was his friend, admirer and party comrade, and who today subscribes to many 
of the views held by Fukuyama and is President of the Republic of Bolivia. 
It is testimony to the generosity of the people of Chile that last year Jorge 
Rios and the other foreigners who died in the Estadio Chile were each 
remembered in song alongside their compatriots as that place was subjected to 
to a secular and remarkably optimistic 'purification', or exorcism. Perhaps a 
response more fitting to the present occasion would be to reserve a quota of 
doubt with respect to both the inevitability of history and the full identity of its 
authors. 
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